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Mobilizing in borderline citizenship regimes. 
A comparative analysis of undocumented migrants' collective actions 1 
 
This article seeks to explain how and why groups and networks of undocumented migrants mobilizing in 
Berlin, Montreal and Paris since the beginning of the 2000s construct different types of claims. We explore 
the relationship between undocumented migrants and state authorities at the local level through the concept 
of the citizenship regime and its specific application to undocumented migrants (which we describe as the 
“borderline citizenship regime”). Despite their common formal exclusion from citizenship, non-status 
migrants experience different degrees and forms of exclusion in their daily lives, in terms of access to certain 
rights and services, recognition and belonging within the state (whether through formally or non-formally 
recognized means). As a result, they have an opportunity to create different, specific forms of leeway in the 
society in which they live. The concurrence of these different degrees of exclusion and different forms of 
leeway defines specific conditions of mobilization. We demonstrate how the content of their claims are 
influenced by these conditions of mobilization.  
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The absence of residence papers for migrants living in a territory is a unique situation that 
denies these persons the right to be there, and places them in an highly precarious situation of legal, 
social and economic exclusion. Undocumented migrants are the “excluded among the excluded.”i 
They have collectively mobilized against this legal exclusion, generally in alliance with other social 
groups. For example, in Paris, Berlin and Montreal (and in many other locations),ii networks of 
undocumented migrants regularly organize public collective protest actions, such as 
demonstrations, marches and occupations. The type of actions these networks engage in are diverse: 
sometimes they launch extreme forms of protests such as hunger strikes; other times they use 
moderate styles of claims-making, such as lobbying campaigns or consciousness-raising campaigns 
through the media.  
 
This article focuses on such mobilizations in a comparative perspective. We analyze the 
collective actions of undocumented migrants in three different cities: Berlin, Montreal and Paris. 
The comparison reveals their diversity with respect to the networks mobilized, the nature of their 
claims and the manner in which their arguments are constructed. For instance, movements of non-
status persons in Berlin, Paris and Montreal attach different meanings to their causes: while in Paris 
and Montreal, the cause is presented as a multi-faceted one (labor conditions, housing conditions, 
risk of arrest and deportation, etc.), in Berlin, it is presented as a single issue (the confinement of 
non-status persons). Similarly, while the cause of undocumented migrants is often linked to other 
causes in Paris, thereby providing an opportunity to establish connections with other movements 
(and thus change the type of networks mobilized), it is a more isolated movement in Berlin and in 
Montreal. 
The main objective of the paper is to tackle the following empirical puzzle: despite the fact 
that they are constructed around the same central claim - access to a legal residence status - the 
mobilizations of undocumented migrants take different forms and have different content in the three 
locations that we studied. How and why do they differ according to place? 
We argue that undocumented migrants define their mobilizations differently in these three 
contexts because the conditions of mobilization are different: that is, they have different concrete 
possibilities for building alliances and networks, for accessing the media and other social actors and 
for using material and symbolic resources. These conditions are the result of a dual process. 
First, the conditions of mobilization are influenced by the degrees and forms of exclusion that 
undocumented people experience on a daily basis. Like other excluded populations (homeless, poor 
people or unemployed for example), undocumented migrants face a series of conditions negatively 
affecting their ability to mobilize: they have few resources,iii they have difficulties in establishing a 
collective identity,iv and they face specific challenges, some of them directly linked to their 
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situation of illegality in the eyes of state authorities (for example, the simple fact of participating in 
public collective action exposes them to the risk of being arrested and deported).v State legislation 
and public servants’ practicesvi thus have a structuring effect on the conditions of mobilization of 
undocumented migrants.  
Conditions of mobilization are also influenced by undocumented migrants own social 
practices. Especially, their “residence strategies”vii create some leeway in their daily life and help 
them manage - or adapt to - their situation of exclusion. Non-status persons are not passive subjects: 
they live in societies, work, marry, pay taxes, consume goods and services and send their children 
to school. By engaging in these day-to-day activities, they create certain spaces of inclusion for 
themselves and for their relatives. In the course of their daily interactions (with employers, 
neighbors, controlling forces, allied activists, etc.), they define strategies that allow them to deal 
with the exclusionary mechanisms they face. In doing so, they are able to move the boundaries 
defined by public authorities, and so to improve the conditions of mobilization that they face.  
Referring to the concept of “citizenship regime”viii, we define the interaction between these 
two aspects of their experience as the process through which a “borderline citizenship regime” is 
built. We argue that the features of this citizenship regime define specific conditions of mobilization 
that will influence the content of their collective actions. The three borderline citizenship regimes 
that we consider (in Berlin, Montreal and Paris) represent three different sets of conditions of 
mobilization for undocumented migrants. They explain a large part of the variation in the content of 
the mobilizations we observed. 
 
Our argument is both similar to and distinct from the current literature on mobilizations of 
excluded or marginalized populations. As in most of these studies, we consider undocumented 
migrants mobilizations as “unlikely”ix because these populations face structuring conditions of 
exclusion that limit their access to material resources and constrain their actions.x We agree that 
material conditions of mobilization have an influence on their content.xi We also consider that the 
variations among the groups we are analyzing are not the main reason why we find differences in 
the content of their mobilizations. We argue that the characteristics of the networks involved in 
defending the cause of undocumented migrants are also linked to the conditions of mobilization that 
they face. Of course, this is not the only factor accounting for variation but we argue that it plays a 
major role in explaining who is mobilized in each location. The originality of our argument lies in 
that our focus is less on the structural constraints than on the creative practices and strategies that 
undocumented migrants develop to deal with these structuring forces.  
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We first present the concept of a borderline citizenship regime, and show how it can be used 
to analyze undocumented migrants’ mobilizations in a comparative perspective. We then present 
the empirical results of our three cases and conclude with a comparative synthesis. 
 
Beyond exclusion from citizenship: the borderline citizenship regime and the conditions of 
mobilization 
 
In modern western states, citizenship defines who we are by granting us a nationality. It also 
defines what we are entitled to in political, social and economic terms. For this reason, citizenship 
plays a decisive role in determining our relationship to the state. Aside from citizenship, there exist 
a multitude of other statuses defined by the state which delineate legal and administrative 
categories, attributing some of the rights normally granted to citizens. These statuses concern 
permanent or temporary immigration (permanent resident status, migrant worker status, foreign 
student status, refugee status, etc.). The non-recognition of certain rights gives immigrants a limited 
status of citizenship: unlike citizens, they are “denizens”xii (non-nationals whose right of residence 
is unlimited) and “foreigners” (non-national whose right of residence or stay is limited).xiii Aside 
from these statuses, which are recognized and regulated by the state (full-fledged citizens and the 
various immigration statuses), a fringe of the population lives, works and studies in the absence of 
any legal recognition.xiv In the eyes of the authorities, they are not citizens, or denizens, or even 
foreigners (all of which imply a legal status); they are “non-status immigrants”.xv As Coutin 
underscores, in legal terms they occupy a “space of non-existence” for state authorities.xvi Thus, in 
the eyes of the authorities, they are “non-persons”.xvii Paradoxically, this situation of legal exclusion 
is also a situation of great dependence on the state: the state alone has the power to legalize their 
situation and integrate them into the territory’s political community or, conversely, to deport them. 
The question of citizenship is thus at the heart of the undocumented migrant’s life. 
 
Scholars who have analyzed the exclusion of migrants and/or minoritiesxviii have examined 
the citizenship issue through two dimensions. The first dimension is defined by the individual’s 
“access to the nation”:xix nation-states determine which individuals have access to citizenship and to 
civil, social and political rights. This has led scholars to distinguish civic states from ethnic states or 
to compare and contrast the French and German notions of citizenship.xx The second dimension 
defines citizenship from the perspective of minorities’ access to collective and cultural rights. 
Scholars have compared assimilationist states (France in particular) and multicultural states (such as 
Great Britain, Canada and the United States)xxi based on their degree of tolerance toward particular 
identities. Moreover, scholars have shown further that formal access to citizenship is not to be 
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confused with the actual recognition of these rights: citizens with immigrant backgrounds have 
formal access to civil, social and political rights; however, they often face discrimination. 
 
In discussions concerning undocumented migrants, attention is generally focused on the first 
dimension. The status of undocumented migrants is by definition a “non-status” for the nation-state; 
it is defined by a denial of individuals’ access to civil, social and political rights. Their living 
conditions are determined first and foremost by their exclusion from these rights, rather than by 
access to collective rights and the actual recognition of these rights. This being said, the situation of 
undocumented migrants in democratic countries is never one of total exclusion from civil, social 
and political rights: they find themselves at the “borders” as well as at the “boundaries” of 
citizenship.xxii Here, the issue of geographic borders is closely related to the limits of belonging to 
the community. Undocumented migrants have crossed the borders. Their exclusion from the 
boundaries of citizenship cannot be total: certain minimal rights (such as the right to be admitted to 
a hospital in the event of an emergency) are often guaranteed to any person living within the 
territory (even if this person is considered by authorities to be “illegal”). The exclusion of 
undocumented migrants can exist to different degrees and take on different forms depending on the 
state in which they live. 
 
The concept of citizenship regimexxiii provides us with a better understanding of the types of 
leeway created by non-status persons in their interactions with their environments and offers a very 
useful tool for comparison of our three cases. The concept of citizenship regime “denotes the 
institutional arrangements, rules and understandings that guide and shape concurrent policy 
decisions and expenditures of states, problem definitions by states and citizens and claims-making 
by citizens.”xxiv Citizenship regimes are defined by three dimensions. The first dimension—
access—refers to formal access to rights that distinguish the various citizenship statuses and that 
define non-citizens by default. The second dimension—recognition—refers to the conditions of 
access to political representation, whether in terms of institutional arrangements or the legitimacy of 
actors and claims. The third dimension—belonging—refers to the most symbolic aspect of society 
in terms of belonging to a political community (national belonging and/or nationality). Non-status 
migrants are, in the words of Benedict Anderson, at the boundaries of “imagined communities.”xxv 
 
The conditions of mobilization of undocumented migrants are determined by their status of 
exclusion from the citizenship regime and the way in which they deal with it. Because it is possible 
to define different types of citizenship regimes,xxvi it is also possible to distinguish different types of 
exclusion from this regime and different forms of leeway created by undocumented persons to deal 
 6 
with their exclusion. This dual process defines what we refer to as a “borderline citizenship regime” 
in which undocumented persons live and become mobilized. This notion entails that the condition 
of undocumented migrants is determined by their situation at the border of the citizenship regime. 
On the one side, it implies that they are neither included, nor fully excluded from it: they live in an 
in-between situation which structures their existence. On the other side, it implies that 
undocumented migrants have the possibility (whether through formal or informal means) to deal 
concretely (on the basis of their day-to-day social practices and strategies) with this border and 
therefore to move it. In that sense, borders are not only physical barriers delimitating states’ 
territories, separating the domestic from the foreign. They consist also in more immaterial and 
changing limits that create social spaces of inclusion and exclusion within the polis. In other words, 
“they demarcate belonging and non-belonging and authorize a distinction between norms and 
exception”.xxvii This distinction does not necessarily coincide with states’ territorial limits. In this 
regard, the border can be conceptualized as a zone (constructed by laws, practices and 
discourses),xxviii or a “process”.xxix Thus, following Nyers, the border’s zone “merges places such as 
health care clinics, social housing cooperatives, schools, food banks, welfare offices and police 
stations within a ubiquitous elsewhere”.xxx  
 
Jenson and Papillonxxxi have shown that access to the rights defined by the citizenship regime 
(and their actual recognition) influences the construction of the identities and interests of collective 
and political actors and thus influences the process of political representation. We argue that the 
same is true regarding the borderline citizenship regime. In particular, we demonstrate that the 
citizenship regime influences the type of access to political representation that undocumented 
migrants have or do not have, because the opportunities for—and variety of—interactions between 
networks of undocumented migrants and others social groups will also vary in each case. The 
concept of a borderline citizenship regime encompasses the structuring context in which 
undocumented migrants build their identities and interests in each of the cases considered.xxxii  
As in the case of the citizenship regime, the borderline citizenship regime can be 
characterized in terms of access, recognition and belonging. 
1) Access: we have focused on four types of access, that is, to the labor market, to housing, to 
healthcare services and to education (for children of undocumented migrants). States provide 
undocumented migrants with legal access to some of these rights.xxxiii However, in cases where they 
do not have legal access to these rights, they sometimes have access to certain services in an 
informal (or not formally recognized) manner. We have taken this possibility into account in 
comparing our three cases. As we discuss in the second part of our article, informal access depends 
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on the practices of police control in the public space. Indirectly, it depends very much on state-
defined deportation policies.  
2) Recognition: theoretically, there is no room for recognition of undocumented migrants by 
the state; they remain on the territory illegally, and in order to survive they should not, as 
individuals or as a group, seek any recognition. Nevertheless, undocumented migrants can be 
recognized by the state as part of the community when they gain access to the citizenship regime 
through a regularization procedure. States can launch regularization programs from time to time, or 
they can define a right to regularization that depends on specific criteria (for example, the length of 
the stay in the territory). The criteria for regularization vary over time and space, and the possibility 
of regularization is the main indicator for comparing the degrees of recognition of undocumented 
person in Berlin, Montreal and Paris. Apart from this binary dimension (i.e., only two solutions 
exist: you are either inside the political community and recognized by the state or you are on the 
outside and not recognized), partial collective recognition does occur, especially when 
undocumented migrants have the concrete opportunity to exist as collective actors. This opportunity 
relies on several factors, but one appears particularly crucial: the existence of alliances with other 
(already recognized) actors. These two criteria (the possibility of regularization and the existence of 
alliances) form the basis for analyzing the recognition dimension in each case. 
3) Belonging: undocumented migrants represent a political problem for all governments and 
are usually presented as such in political discourse. However, the intensity of this public exposure 
can vary over time and place and different forms of symbolic exclusion may be observed. As shown 
by Baudinoxxxiv in her analysis of debates concerning gender equality in Belgium, the identity of 
persons who have access to the regime (the rights-holders) and the identity of the excluded are also 
defined by the manner in which public problems are constructed and debated in the public sphere. 
From this perspective, aside from the issue of denial of access to civil, social and political rights, 
and aside from the absence of recognition, the exclusion of undocumented migrants from the 
citizenship regime has a symbolic aspect as well: the designation of illegal migrations in the public 
sphere as a public problem by public authorities. In order to address this issue, we have focused on 
one indicator: the politicization of illegal migration (in other words, the extent to which public 
authorities prioritize the handling of this issue in their public discourses). The greater the 
politicization of the illegal migration issue, the greater the symbolic exclusion of undocumented 
migrants from the citizenship regime. As we will demonstrate, strong politicization of the issue is 
often associated with rapid reinforcement of the legal exclusion of undocumented migrants. In other 
words, politicization serves to justify new restrictive policies and practices.xxxv  
Depending on the manner in which these three dimensions are articulated, undocumented 
migrants are able to create different forms of leeway, defining specific citizenship regimes for 
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themselves. Different citizenship regimes at the border offer different conditions of mobilization 
that affect the way collective actors build their own cause and express their identities and interests 
through their discourses.  After presenting our methodology and case selection, we will demonstrate 
how these elements interact in the cases of three cities: Paris, Berlin and Montreal. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
Our research is based on a comparison of networks of undocumented migrants at the local 
level. Decisions regarding the conditions of exclusion of undocumented migrants are generally 
taken at the national level, and sometimes internationally, but they are always applied at the local 
level.xxxvi Furthermore, undocumented migrants construct their mobilizations primarily at the local 
level.xxxvii Finally, the size of our unit of analysis, i.e. the city, allows us to build a virtually 
comprehensive sample: in Montreal, we have considered all important groups and networks 
mobilizing for the regularization of undocumented migrants from 2000 to 2009; in Berlin and in 
Paris, we have considered almost all of them for the same period.  
These three cities are comparable in terms of the populations of undocumented migrants 
living on their respective territories but differ substantially with regard to the type of exclusion from 
the citizenship regime they offer. While they differ in size and status (two are capitals and the other 
is not), they are major economical urban centers in which undocumented migrants can establish 
themselves and have an opportunity to work, more often than not in the secondary and tertiary 
sectors. However, the immigration policies that are applied in each case are very different (in terms 
of detention procedures, possibility of regularization, politicization of the issue, etc.). These 
comparable yet contrasting cases offer an excellent framework for analyzing the connections 
between the citizenship regimes as experienced by non-status persons (the citizenship regimes at the 
border) and the contents of their mobilizations.  
 
In each case, we analyze these connections by examining the discourses of the main groups 
and networks that mobilize around the cause of non-status persons.xxxviii As several authors have 
underscored, discourses are the result of the daily experiences of the actors within social 
movements, rather than a strategic tool used independently from their own experiences and the 
events they face.xxxix In this respect, the discourses of social movements are an expression of the 
identities and interests they have constructed in the course of their mobilizations, the result of the 
interaction among their intentionality, their environment and their strategies. Following this line of 
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query, we rely on the various types of discourses produced by networks of undocumented migrants 
in Montreal, Paris and Berlin. 
 
We have selected 16 groups and networks (seven in Paris, four in Montreal and five in Berlin) 
mobilizing for the inclusion of undocumented migrants in recent years and that are representative of 
the most important mobilizations defending their cause  in these three cities during the 2000s. We 
focus on two types of collective actors: groups or networks of undocumented migrants only (such as 
the 9e Collectif des Sans-Papiers (9th Collective of Undocumented Persons in Paris), the Coalition 
against the Deportation of Palestinian Refugees in Montreal and the Voice Refugee Forum in 
Berlin); networks of undocumented migrants and individual or collective actors, such as trade 
unions, which considered themselves as allies  (e.g., Réseau Education Sans Frontières (Education 
Without Borders Network) in Paris, Solidarity Across Borders in Montreal or No Lager in Berlin). 
These groups and networks vary in terms of size, history and organization. As we will develop, 
many of these variations are linked to the different conditions of mobilizations faced by 
undocumented migrants in these three cities. We will show in particular that, because of these 
differences, the groups mobilizing in Paris are generally bigger in size, have a longer history, and 
have more diversified allies than in Montreal and Berlin. We will also show that undocumented 
migrants’ groups are more often organized on the basis of the countries of origin in Montreal than 
in Berlin and Paris. Beyond these variations, these groups and networks have however some 
common traits: they are non-professionalized grass-roots organizations; they have few material 
resources (much of these are provided by the networks of allies); they are rather small and act 
mainly at the local level; and they are recent (most of them were created during the 2000s). We 
collected approximately 250 public documents published by these groups and networks from 2000 
to 2009.xl These documents (e.g., communiqués, calls for demonstrations, petitions) were produced 
in the course–and for the purpose–of their mobilizations. They organize and publicly justify the 
collective actions they construct, such as demonstrations, marches, public meetings, lobbying 
campaigns, occupations and hunger-strikes. We performed a comparative analysis of these 
documents through discourse categories developed by frame analysis,xli focusing on the distinction 
of various diagnostics (the definition of a problematic situation), prognostics (the presentation of 
the means to solve a problem situation) and motivations (the presentation of a rationale for 
mobilization). We also examined how the cause of undocumented migrants is connected (or is not 
connected) to other causes. 
 
We begin our discussion of the cases of Berlin, Paris and Montreal by presenting the details 
of the borderline citizenship regime in each case, as well as their impact on the concrete conditions 
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of mobilization of non-status persons. Then, we demonstrate how these elements are connected with 
the discourses of groups and networks mobilizing for the defense of undocumented migrants 
through three dimensions: the degree of diversification of the diagnostics on which they rely; the 
various lines of differentiation within the cause of undocumented migrants; and the connection of 
their cause with other related causes. 
 
Berlin: Isolation as a primary condition of mobilization and the definition of specific issue-
oriented mobilizations to denounce organized segregation 
 
 Germany has long been considered a “reticent immigration country”;xlii since the middle of 
the 1970s, immigration control policies have become increasingly restrictive, and access to civil, 
social and political rights has become increasingly difficult for migrants living in the German 
territory.xliii This still holds true today.xliv For undocumented migrants, the result is a system of 
strong marginalization. This system is characterized by both a formal and an informal exclusion 
from the citizenship regime resulting in restricted mobility at the local level. This is, however, 
counter-balanced by certain opportunities for regularization and by a relatively low level of 
symbolic exclusion from the citizenship regime (the illegal migration issue is politicized at selected 
times only and rarely receives front-page coverage in the media). These elements orient the content 
of mobilizations, which focus more on living conditions (as opposed to a demand for regularization 
or access to certain rights) and fight first and foremost against social isolation. 
 
 In Germany, undocumented migrants are excluded from most of the rights attached to the 
citizenship regime: they have no access to the labor market, to health services (except in case of 
emergency), to housing or to education.xlv Since Germany is the European state that deports the 
largest number of migrants,xlvi police controls are very frequent in the public space. Moreover, in 
Berlin particularly, a specific police agency (Arbeitsgebiet Ausländer) has been responsible for 
immigration issues since 1971. One of its tasks is to control undocumented migrants with a view to 
possible deportations.xlvii In this context, informal access to rights related to the citizenship regime 
is challenging. For example, the illegal labor market (even if it is expanding) remains limited and is 
difficult for undocumented migrants to access because controls are frequent.xlviii In addition, most of 
the undocumented migrants who work illegally do so in non-public spaces where they are more 
shielded from controls (e.g., domestic work, small garment factories and restaurants).xlix With 
regards to access to other rights, the German law on foreigners (Ausländergesetz) requires providers 
of public services (schools, hospitals, employment agencies) to inform immigration services of any 
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infractions regarding immigration legislation. Public service providers work as a part of the 
migration controls policy.l  
 
 In Berlin, formal exclusion from the citizenship regime is associated with a powerful system 
of control, which is extended to most sectors of social life. In this context, the mobility of 
undocumented migrants at the local level is very limited: the fear of police controls is permanent, 
and the interactions of undocumented migrants with social groups outside the immigrant 
community are difficult. Furthermore, some of the undocumented migrants living in the German 
territory (those who cannot be regularized but who cannot be deported either)li face a process of 
detention or “obligation of residence” (Residenzpflicht): they must live in reception centers and 
cannot leave the district in which they have been placed. The undocumented migrants living in 
these centers are indeed facing a situation of total isolation. They are often situated in isolated areas 
(in the region of Berlin, there are four centers), and their interaction with social groups outside of 
these centers is very limited. For example, because they do not have the right to work, they have a 
minimum living allowance paid by the state, which is given in the form of vouchers and which can 
only be used in a limited number of shops. The undocumented migrants living in these reception 
centers have limited movement outside the centers and develop a feeling of total dependence vis-à-
vis public authority. Like most of the undocumented migrants living in Germany, these 
undocumented migrants live in closed-quarters; at the local level, they face a process of 
marginalization that limits their interactions with social groups included in the citizenship regime. 
This situation is particularly difficult for undocumented migrants from African countries: because 
of the color of their skin, the risk of control by the police in public places is high.lii The border 
separating undocumented migrants from the rest of the population living in Germany is not only a 
legal border; it is also a border defined in terms of skin color.  
 
Furthermore, the possibility of escaping from these conditions and obtaining recognition from 
the state are very rare. German law does provide some opportunities for regularization: between 
1996 and 2007, approximately 120,000 undocumented migrants were regularized.liii These 
opportunities are, however, limited: they apply solely to persons with the status of “tolerance” 
(Duldung) and, most of the time, lead to a residence permit of only one or two years (after which 
time the possibility of deportation is re-evaluated depending on the situation in the country of 
origin).  
 
Finally, we find an intermediate level of symbolic exclusion with respect to the dimension of 
belonging. The issue of illegal immigration has rarely been strongly politicized in Germany since 
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the beginning of the 2000s.liv In the early 1990s, the high politicization of asylum policies led to 
dramatic events: an aggressive anti-immigrant press campaign was launched and several asylum-
seekers were killed by neo-Nazi groups.lv Since that time, the moderate political class has agreed to 
avoid framing the immigration policy issue as primarily a “public problem” (separate from the issue 
of the integration of foreigners). Specific episodes (such as the Visa Affair in the early 2000slvi) 
have raised the importance of this issue in public debates. The politicization of the illegal 
immigration issue, however, remains low in comparison with other European countries.lvii 
 
In Berlin, undocumented migrants face conditions of isolation from the rest of the population 
living on the German territory. Their mobility at the local level is limited, and they live in closed 
quarters at the margins of society. This is particularly true for migrants who are affected by the 
Residenzpflicht law and who are assigned to reception centers. The borderline citizenship regime is 
therefore characterized by isolation, or at least a marked separation between non-status migrants 
and German citizens. How are these conditions of mobilization related to the discourses of groups 
and networks that mobilize on behalf of undocumented migrants? 
 
 
As one would expect, the discourse of undocumented migrants organizing as collective actors 
focuses mainly on conditions of isolation and their consequences on living conditions. The most 
important object of the mobilizations in Berlin is the Residenzpflicht law. For example, the Voice 
Refugee Forum (mobilizing in the north-east of Germany) presents itself as follows: 
 
Germany is the only country in Europe where refugees are criminalized by the law of the 
movement restriction (Residenzpflicht). This law shows that refugees in Germany are meant 
to be socially isolated, not only being kept in far away camps in the middle of forests, also the 
restriction of movement by the “Residenzpflicht” law excludes refugees from the mainstream 
societies by not allowing them to mix with the general populace, fellow refugees and migrants 
who may be living in other cities. 
The movement restriction law keeps refugees from seeing their doctors, their lawyers, their 
friends and relatives and for some of them worst of all from continuing the political activities 
that made them flee their country in the first instance. The government law is gagging us in a 
way.lviii 
 
The mobilizations focus on the most extreme form of isolation and demand an end to the 
detention measures. As mentioned above, the Residenzpflicht law applies only to some of the 
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undocumented migrants living in Germany (those who cannot be regularized but who cannot be 
deported either). Paradoxically, collective demands concern those undocumented migrants who are 
most protected from deportation measures. This line of differentiation (between those who are 
affected by the Residenzpflicht and those who are not) is hard to overcome, and the definition of 
more general claims that would apply to all undocumented migrants living in Germany is difficult 
to develop. For instance, we find fewer claims demanding the end of deportation measures or better 
working conditions than in the cases of Montreal and Paris.  
 
Lastly, given the minimal politicization of the illegal immigration issue in Germany, 
mobilizations of undocumented migrants in Berlin have had a low level of visibility, and they have 
experienced less diversified forms of support. Our documentary analysis reveals that the 
communiqués and calls launched in Berlin have limited and homogeneous lists of co-signatories: 
most of them are groups and networks from autonomous movements. Comprehensive associations 
mobilizing for the defense of human rights, associations mobilizing around other causes, trade 
unions and political parties are rarely involved in these mobilizations. Their process of frame 
bridging remains limited; the cause of undocumented migrants is rarely linked with other causes. 
Undocumented migrants mobilizing in Berlin must take their cause into the public sphere: being 
less politicized, their situation is generally ignored by public opinion and they have difficulty 
finding allies during their mobilizations. Their discourse focuses on the awareness of potential 
allies. The cause of undocumented migrants is often presented through a humanitarian frame; it 
focuses on individual cases and on their daily living conditions in order to sensitize the public to 
what it means to be undocumented in Berlin. For example, in a call launched in 2008, the group 
Initiative Togo Action Plus illustrated the consequences of the Residenzpflicht law through one 
particular case: 
 
This is to prevent refugees from integration, to isolate them from the world around 
them. This law punishes a lot of refugees who do not know which way to follow. This is 
the case with the political refugee Kodjo D'Almelda of the Initiative “TOGO ACTION 
PLUS”. Actually, Kodjo has been many times a victim of this racist law. He travelled 
many times without permission because it would have meant that he pays 10 Euro each 
time he asked for permission: for 1, 2, 3 days or 1 week. In the region of Sachsen 
Anhalt (Halle Saalkreis), it is an obligation to pay 10 Euro, if not you are refused 
permission. He has been controlled 6 times. The first time he had to pay 65 Euro to the 
alien office, the second time 65 Euro and the third time also 65 Euro. The fourth time he 
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was summoned to court and was threatened with imprisonment if he failed to appear in 
court on the day of the court process.lix 
 
As we can see, the situation of total isolation that some undocumented migrants experience on 
a daily basis tends to shape the kind of claims that collective actors can make and to limit the scope 
of their mobilizations; it is challenging to present claims defined in general terms that would apply 
to the situation of all undocumented migrants living in Germany. This goes hand in hand with a 
very low level of alliances with other collective actors: in Berlin (as in Montreal, as we will see 
below), networks of undocumented migrants are operating very much alone. Their first obstacle is 
to be recognized as a political issue in the public space. 
 
 
Paris: A more encompassing borderline citizenship regime, with changing mobilizations 
focused on improving living conditions for inclusion as full citizens 
 
 In Paris, the exclusion of undocumented migrants from the citizenship regime is less 
extensive than in Berlin. However, this situation has been changing since the beginning of the 
2000s. In the context of high politicization of the illegal immigration issue, both the formal and 
informal access of undocumented migrants to the rights attached to citizenship is increasingly 
restricted and their mobility at the local level is more and more limited. Furthermore, fewer 
opportunities for regularization exist today than in the past. Nevertheless, compared to the case of 
Berlin, mobilizations are quite different and rely on strong alliances with recognized collective 
actors included in society. 
 
 In contrast with Germany, undocumented migrants living in France have more formal rights. 
They have access to public health care, and children are allowed to attend school.lx In addition, 
illegal occupation of land and the illegal labor markets are more prevalent in France (as in most 
southern European countries) than in Germany,lxi and undocumented migrants can access jobs and 
housing more readily through informal means. Regularization procedures are more open as well, 
and they lead to a more stable status (long-term residence permits). From 1998 to 2006, 
undocumented migrants were regularized if they could prove that they had resided in France for 
over 10 years, in the case of an illness that could not be treated in the country of origin, or if they 
had children born in France. Approximately 25,000 individuals have benefited from this 
regularization procedure in each of these years. 
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 The situation is rapidly changing, however. Since the mid-2000s, the frequent legislative 
and administrative reforms have limited the rights of undocumented migrants significantly. In 2006, 
the option of regularization after 10 years of residence in the French territory was repealed. Since 
2006 as well, employers have been required to verify that their employees (or future employees) 
have a work permit. Informal access to the labor market is thus considerably restricted. Above all, 
the explosion of the number of deportation procedureslxii has had harmful consequences. Police 
controls have increased significantly and intensified the exclusion of undocumented migrants. With 
the multiplication of police controls, undocumented migrants have more difficulty accessing 
providers of public services. For example, the right to education is limited by the mushrooming of 
controls in the school environment. Also, informal access to housing and employment is 
increasingly limited due to the multiplication of police controls in these sectors. All in all, the 
mobility of undocumented migrants at the local level is becoming considerably reduced because the 
risks of controls in the public space are increasing. In Paris, police controls are conducted in areas 
with dense populations of foreigners, and control practices reveal that the exclusion of 
undocumented migrants from the citizenship regime is higher for people of color. As in Berlin, 
individuals from African countries are subject to more controls than other people and are forced to 
limit their mobility.lxiii Another consequence of the explosion of deportations is the rise in detention 
procedures: from 2000 to 2007, the number of undocumented migrants placed in detention centers 
increased from 17,000 to 35,000, and the maximum length of detention increased from 12 to 32 
days.lxiv 
 
 In contrast with the situation in Berlin, the issue of illegal migration has been defined by 
public authorities as a major “public problem” since the beginning of the 2000s.lxv The high 
politicization of this issue has served to justify frequent legislative and administrative changes: from 
2000 to 2008, no less than five legislative reforms have involved immigration controls.lxvi Since 
2002 and the strong performance in the presidential elections of the Front National (FN), an 
extreme-right party, French governments have politicized the issue in order to attract the FN 
electorate.lxvii This has resulted in the transformation of public discourses related to illegal 
immigration into a “securitarian discourse,”lxviii fostering a high symbolic exclusion of 
undocumented migrants.lxix 
 
In Paris, the borderline citizenship regime is characterized on the whole by partial access to 
rights, certain opportunities for recognition and a very high degree of politicization. How do these 
conditions of mobilization interfere with the content of the discourses presented by undocumented 
migrants? 
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Undocumented migrants mobilizing in Paris (and in Montreal as we will see below), unlike 
their counterparts in Berlin, present their condition from a variety of angles. For example, while the 
undocumented migrants mobilizing in Berlin emphasize their exclusion from the labor market, 
those mobilizing in Paris emphasize their concrete (informal) inclusion when denouncing their 
working conditions. This is evident from a call launched by the 9e Collectif des Sans-Papiers in 
Paris: 
 
Hundreds of thousands of undocumented persons work in the construction industry, public 
works, food services and the hotel industry. (…) They work at difficult and essential jobs. 
Because of them, roads are extended, houses are built, hot meals are prepared, the laundry is 
done. (…) 
They participate in the economy, and each day they are hunted in a most inhumane fashion 
and are described as taking advantage of aid and welfare. (…) This is a lie perpetuated for 
political and economic reasons: to divide the weakest members of society, blaming foreigners, 
and undocumented persons in particular, for their problems; and to create a docile, cheap 
labor force, at the mercy of employers and police, who are subject to exploitation and who 
can be fired at a moment’s notice, and whose only right is to obey and be quiet. lxx (Author’s 
translation) 
  
Undocumented migrants are required to use diverse arguments in their discourses when 
presenting the various aspects of their lives. Therefore, a description of their situation on the labor 
market goes hand-in-hand with the fight against economic exploitation. This issue is also often 
linked with the defense of fundamental rights or the fight against racism. Our analysis reveals, 
however, that the situation is changing. Since the mid-2000s, the restriction of rights has oriented 
the public discourses formulated by groups and networks of undocumented migrants on issues of 
repression and persecution, and on issues of isolation. However, in comparison with Berlin, the 
discourses of the movements mobilizing in Paris remain more diversified.  
 
The specific demands formulated by networks of undocumented migrants in Paris define 
several lines of differentiation within their movements. Undocumented migrants have put forward 
demands, directly linked with the changes in immigration policies, for specific categories. In 2003, 
they insisted on the regularization of individuals facing deportation. In 2004, they began to demand 
the regularization of families with children attending school (in particular, with the network Réseau 
éducation sans frontiers (Education without Borders Network), which includes the main education 
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unions). More recently, they demanded the regularization of undocumented migrants on the basis of 
their participation in the French economy (the campaign for the regularization of all migrant 
workers). In recent years as well, they have demanded the release of all undocumented migrants 
held in detention. All of these fights were led by groups of undocumented migrants and by central 
collective actors, such as the main trade unions and several left-wing parties. 
 
Each of these specific claims is based on a particular line of cleavage within the general cause 
of the undocumented migrants (for example, between migrant workers and migrants who do not 
work). These lines of cleavage emerge (or deepen) when changes to immigration policy suddenly 
affect one aspect of their daily experiences. For example, the demand for the regularization of 
families with children attending school emerged when new police practices allowing for the 
identification of undocumented migrants’ children in schools came into force. 
 
 Lastly, in Paris, in contrast with Berlin (and Montreal as we will see below), 
undocumented migrants often relate their claims with claims put forward by other social 
movements: they follow an extensive process of frame bridging. Due to the high level of 
politicization of the illegal immigration issue, undocumented migrants have had the opportunity to 
find diverse allies. Indeed, the high politicization of this issue has led diverse actors (political 
parties and leaders, trade unions, journalists, social movements, etc.) to take a position. The cause 
of the undocumented migrants has become visible in the public sphere and has allowed various 
opponents of the French government to support it. This has led undocumented migrants to relate 
their mobilization with other social movements, as they have found many allies at the local level 
during the course of their collective actions. This frame-bridging dynamic is visible in their 
discourse. Thus, many of the communiqués or calls for demonstration launched by groups of 
undocumented migrants are co-signed by associations and networks mobilizing around other issues 
(such as Droit au Logement (Right to Housing),lxxi Act Uplxxii and the Coordination des 
Intermittents et Précaires d’Ile de France (Coordination of Intermittent Workers and Precarious 
Persons of the Ile de France),lxxiii or by generalist associations mobilizing for the defense of human 
rights (such as the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme (League for the Defense of Human Rights) and 
Amnesty International. Many of them have also been co-signed by trade unions and political parties 
from the opposition. The cause of undocumented migrants is often related with the causes of 
precarious workers, the unemployed, victims of racism, persons living in poor-quality housing, etc. 
In a call to demonstration symptomatically entitled “Etudiants, sans-papiers, salariés, intermittents, 
chômeurs, retraités, tous précaires, tous solidaires” (Students, undocumented persons, workers, 
laborers, intermittent workers, retired persons, all precarious, all solidary) the 9e Collectif des sans-
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papiers (supported by several associations and networks) denounced all governmental policies that 
create “social insecurity”: 
 
Elected in 2002 against a backdrop of an extensive political consensus to bring about the 
failure of the Front National, the current government has since been applying safe and ultra-
liberal policies that the FN would not have failed to drive ahead; provisions promoting an 
individualistic, utilitarian and slave-like vision of humans. These “fear politics” rest on one 
predicate: equality opportunity for each person and the individualization of risks. 
In other words, a job has to be earned, and being deprived of one is a sign that the individual 
is dysfunctional, left to wallow in his own shame. Social insecurity.lxxiv (Author’s translation) 
  
 The dynamics of the convergence of movements is rooted in history. In the mid-
1990s, the mobilizations of undocumented persons benefited from a cycle of protest in France, 
beginning in December 1995 with the general strike against pension reform. This cycle of protest 
was characterized by a convergence of social movements around a general cause: la cause des 
“sans” (the cause of the have-nots), which was the term used to describe the situations of persons 
without jobs, without decent housing conditions or without residence documents.lxxv In this context, 
undocumented migrants built diversified support networks and managed to place their mobilizations 
at the core of this cycle of protest. 
 
As we can see, the nature of the claims is different in Paris and in Berlin. Because 
undocumented migrants in Paris are living in a citizenship regime that offers more leeway in their 
daily lives, they have more opportunities to do what full citizens do (they work, they go to school, 
they consume goods and services). When these conditions are threatened, they mobilize to preserve 
them. The rationalization of their claims centers on the argument that they are de facto members of 
the political community and contribute to the society and its development. These particular 
conditions of mobilization facilitate the building of alliances with other actors (such as unions) 
included in the citizenship regime and also sustain public sympathy for their cause. The tightening 
of their citizenship regime during the last five years due to changes in public policy has been 
followed by strong popular support of their cause and the denunciation of state repression. 
 
 
Montreal: Paradoxical borderline citizenship regime leading to limited mobilizations 
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 In Montreal, the borderline citizenship regime is characterized by a paradox: undocumented 
migrants face formal exclusion from most of the rights attached to citizenship but at the same time 
have informal access to some of the services provided by the province of Quebec. Their mobility at 
the local level is less restricted than it is in Berlin or even in Paris. Moreover, they do not face 
symbolic exclusion because the issue of illegal immigration is not politicized. 
 
 In Quebec, as in Canada as a whole, the formal rights of undocumented migrants are limited. 
The only public services to which they have access are hospitals (in case of emergency)lxxvi and 
schools. However, many of the undocumented migrants living in Canada have an intermediate 
status that allows access to specific services guaranteed by the citizenship regime. For example, 
persons whose claim for asylum has been refused, but who cannot be deported because their 
country of origin is affected by a moratorium, are entitled to work subject to certain conditions. 
  
 The possibilities for full recognition by a regularization procedure are nonetheless much 
more limited than in France and Germany. The only undocumented migrants who can be 
regularized are those whose country of origin is affected by a moratorium (through a regularization 
for humanitarian considerations).lxxvii For the rest of the undocumented migrants living in Canada, 
no regularization procedure exists. In 2002, over 900 undocumented Algerian migrants living in 
Quebec were regularized following a protest movement against the cancellation of the Algerian 
moratorium. This measure, however, has been employed rarely in Canada since the mid-1990s. 
 
The number of deportations from Canada has risen since the beginning of the 2000s: in 2002–
2003, approximately 7,000 undocumented migrants were deported, and approximately 10,700 were 
deported in 2006-2007.lxxviii However, undocumented migrants who are deported are not arrested 
through police controls in public spaces (even if this practice has been increasing in recent 
years).lxxix Almost all of the undocumented migrants who are deported are asylum-seekers whose 
claim for asylum was refused and who were detained while their case was being considered. The 
increase in deportation procedures coincides with an increase in the detention procedures of 
asylum-seekers (on the grounds of lack of cooperation regarding their identification).lxxx  
 
In comparison with the French and (above all) German cases, the lower risk of control by the 
police in public spaces has several consequences: undocumented migrants have some access to 
social services and housing (especially through community medical centers);lxxxi they have some 
access to the illegal labor market and they work in diverse economic sectors;lxxxii and their mobility 
at the local level is much less limited. It is easier for them to live as full citizens and they are not as 
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limited in the type of interactions they can have with the rest of the population. They have greater 
individual leeway on a daily basis than in the other two cases. 
 
Furthermore, in comparison with both France and Germany, the symbolic exclusion of 
undocumented migrants is rather limited in Quebec, as it is in Canada as a whole. In 2001, the 
Canadian government, in conjunction with the United States government, adopted a “smart border 
action plan,” which constitutes a major change in migration controls for Canada.lxxxiii This issue was 
not, however, debated publicly by the political class when the plan was adopted. More generally, 
the issue of undocumented migrants is not presented as a priority by the public authorities in 
Canada and Quebec; it is not even presented as a problem.lxxxiv 
 
On the whole, exclusion from the citizenship regime is quite restrictive, but the daily living 
conditions of undocumented migrants in Montreal are more similar to those of full citizens, 
compared with the situations in Paris and Berlin, due to the less repressive policies, informal access 
to some services and to paid work, and a lower degree of politicization. The effects of these 
conditions of mobilization on the content of their collective actions are complex. 
 
In Montreal, as in Paris, we observe a tendency to emphasize the de facto contribution to 
Canadian society of undocumented migrants. For example, the network Solidarity Across Borders, 
which is active in Montreal, argues: 
 
Since 2001, the new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act has exacerbated the 
systematic racism, discriminatory criteria and arbitrary decision-making of Immigration 
Canada, creating more obstacles for people to qualify as refugees and permanent 
residents. Additionally, the asylum procedure for refugees lacks an appeal process, and 
bureaucracy has created an enormous backlog. Yet, day by day, this growing underclass 
of exploited clandestine workers, deprived of all rights, fuels the Canadian 
economy.lxxxv 
 
Nevertheless, in a context of decreased politicization of the illegal immigration issue in 
Canada (as in Germany), the mobilizations of undocumented migrants in Montreal have been less 
visible, and they have enjoyed less diversified support than in Paris. Our analysis reveals that, as in 
Berlin, the lists of co-signatories for communiqués and calls launched in Montreal have been more 
limited and homogeneous. The process of frame bridging is limited (in comparison with Paris), and 
the cause of undocumented migrants is rarely linked with other causes. This leads to the definition 
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of a humanitarian discourse focusing on individual cases and on the daily living conditions of 
undocumented migrants in order to gain the support of potential allies in public opinion. For 
instance, in a call launched in November 2004 in Montreal, the Coalition against the Deportation of 
Palestinian Refugees used a humanitarian vocabulary (it denounced the “inhumane detention 
system”) in order to “expose” the situation of undocumented migrants “to the media and the 
public”: 
 
The Immigration and Refugee Board refused to release Ahmad following a detention 
review hearing held today. (…) According to lawyers, Ahmad faces a very high 
likelihood of indefinite detention there simply because he is young, Palestinian and 
male. (…) It is therefore a crucial time to show solidarity with Ahmad and expose 
Immigration Canada's inhumane detention system to the media and the public.lxxxvi 
 
In Montreal, when demands are not formulated in general terms, they concern the nationality 
of undocumented migrants in particular. This is connected to Canadian legislation in terms of 
protection against deportation measures and regularization procedures. Often, undocumented 
migrants construct a mobilization to protest against the cancellation of a moratorium (this was the 
case of the Algerian mobilization of 2002) and to demand their regularization for humanitarian 
reasons on the basis of the situation in their country of origin (as is the case of the Coalition Against 
the Deportation of Palestinian Refugees). These groups do not demand the regularization of all 
undocumented migrants: they demand the regularization of those originating from a specific 
country. Thus, lines of differentiation are created between undocumented migrants of different 
origins. 
 
In each case we observe a strong link between the borderline citizenship regime and the forms 
of mobilizations they build. This conclusion might appear trivial. However, in the last part of this 
article, we propose a comparative synthesis of our results to demonstrate more precisely how the 
particular conditions of mobilization that undocumented migrants face in the citizenship regime in 
which they live affect the content of their public demands when they organize as collective actors. 
 
Synthesis: Citizenship regimes at the border, conditions of mobilizations and forms of protest 
 
Our comparative analysis of Berlin, Montreal and Paris reveals different forms and degrees of 
exclusion that undocumented migrants face in these three cities. The results of this analysis are 
summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1: The exclusion of undocumented migrants in Berlin, Montreal and Paris 
 
 
 Berlin Paris Montreal 
Exclusion from access 
to the services 
guaranteed to citizens 
High Intermediate Intermediate 
 
Level of recognition Low Intermediate Low 
Exclusion from 
belonging 
Intermediate High Low 
 
As we have shown at the very beginning of the article, all undocumented migrants experience 
radical exclusion from citizenship in each of the cases considered, because they are not considered 
as legal subjects of the state. Nevertheless, our analysis of the degree of exclusion from the three 
dimensions of the citizenship regimes reveals that the conditions of mobilization differ significantly 
from one place to another. To be an undocumented migrant in a reception center in Berlin, to live in 
a highly controlled environment in Paris, and to live for all intents and purposes as a nameless 
reality in Montreal does not mean the same thing in terms of concrete possibilities of mobilization. 
In Berlin, the access that undocumented migrants have to certain services guaranteed by the 
citizenship regime is very limited, while in Paris and Montreal, they do have access, either formally 
or informally, to some of these basic services. 
 
In Berlin, Paris and Montreal, undocumented migrants do not experience the same levels of 
recognition. In Paris, undocumented migrants have more opportunities to be regularized than they 
do in Berlin or in Montreal (where these opportunities are very limited). In addition, groups and 
networks of undocumented migrants have more allies among citizens in Paris than in Berlin or 
Montreal.  
 
Lastly, from a symbolic perspective, the issue of undocumented migrants is not defined in the 
exact same way in each society considered. In Quebec, the issue is very rarely a public problem, 
while in France, undocumented migration has been at the top of the political agenda since the mid-
1990s. Germany occupies a middle ground: undocumented migration is defined as a problem, but it 
is hidden from the public sphere as much as possible. 
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Undocumented migrants also experience different degrees of exclusion with regard to the 
belonging dimension. In Paris, because of the high politicization of the issue, undocumented 
migrants are clearly considered by the state as being “on the outside” of the imagined community 
and treated as such by police forces. In Montreal, because undocumented migrants are not identified 
as a public problem, they are not considered to be “on the outside” and have more opportunities to 
act as full citizens. In Berlin, the situation is less clear-cut: because undocumented migrants are 
considered to be “on the outside” of society, they are not an accepted public problem. 
Undocumented migrants are, thus, suffering from public invisibility as well as from repressive 
treatment. 
 
An analysis of the discourses of collective actors demonstrates the existence of similarities 
among networks of undocumented migrants in Berlin, Montreal and Paris. In particular, the 
common condition of formal exclusion from the citizenship regime obliges them to use the injustice 
argument in their discourse. However, as expected, profound differences exist among our three 
cases. An analysis of the materials produced by the movements of undocumented migrants in each 
case since the beginning of the 2000s clearly illustrates three principal dissimilarities. In these three 
cities, undocumented migrants use different types of diagnostics (more or less diversified) to 
express their claims; they define different lines of differentiation within their movement; and they 
relate their causes differently to other causes. These dissimilarities are connected to: different 
degrees and types of difficulty impeding formal and informal access to the services normally 
guaranteed by the citizenship regime; different degrees of difficulty in the recognition of 
undocumented migrants; different degrees of difficulty impeding their belonging. All of these 
dimensions have an influence on the experiences and interactions of undocumented migrants in the 
course of their mobilization and on the definition of their own cause.  
 
 First, differences involving access to the services guaranteed by the citizenship regime are 
connected to the different types of diagnostics that groups of undocumented migrants and networks 
create in each place. In Berlin, undocumented migrants face especially strong exclusion from the 
access dimension, and their conditions of mobilization are characterized by isolation from the rest 
of society. The movements mobilizing in Berlin focus their claims around this particular 
problematic situation. In contrast, in Paris and Montreal, undocumented migrants have less 
difficulty accessing some of the services normally guaranteed by the citizenship regime. They are 
able to create more leeway for themselves in their situation of exclusion, and their conditions of 
mobilization are characterized by the possibility of having more diversified interactions on a daily 
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basis. In the discourses presented by their mobilizations, they tend to define a variety of problematic 
situations (for example, jobs, housing and health care). 
 
Second, our comparison illustrates that the cases of Berlin, Paris and Montreal can be 
distinguished in terms of the fragmentation (or differentiation) of the claims. General claims (such 
as the regularization of all undocumented migrants or the end of all deportation measures) can be 
found in the three cases. These demands concern the overall condition of undocumented migrants, 
whatever the degree or mode of exclusion. However, beyond these common claims, it is interesting 
to note that demands are often formulated with different variations. When demands are more 
specific (that is, when they do not concern all documented migrants), they define different 
categories of undocumented migrants in Berlin, Montreal and Paris. In other words, the lines of 
differentiation between different categories of undocumented migrants are not constructed in the 
same manner. In our three cases, the cause of undocumented migrants is plural, but for different 
reasons: the lines of differentiation distinguishing them correspond to different logics and are 
connected to the most restrictive aspect of legal exclusion from the citizenship regime in each case. 
In Germany, it reflects the condition of isolation; in France, the frequent restrictive immigration 
policy changes; and in Canada, the very limited opportunity for regularization. 
 
Third, we note a difference in terms of the extensiveness of the frame-bridging process. In 
Paris, the cause of the undocumented migrants is often linked to other related causes: movements of 
undocumented migrants are often encompassed by broader social movements related to the fight 
against precarious conditions of life or against racism, for example. In Montreal and Berlin, the 
cause of the undocumented migrants is rarely linked with other related causes, and the movement of 
undocumented migrants appears more isolated. These differences are connected to the degree of 
politicization of the issue in each case. In France, the issue of undocumented migrants is treated as 
an illegal immigration issue and is highly politicized. Strongly excluded from the symbolic 
dimension of the citizenship regime and considered by the state as being “outside” of the national 
community, undocumented migrants, as collective actors, are nevertheless able to build alliances 
with opponents of the French government and to include their mobilizations within wider causes. 
Their symbolic exclusion as an administrative category (illegal immigrants) creates facilitating 
conditions in terms of collective action and protest. In contrast, in Germany and Canada, the lower 
level of politicization of the illegal immigration issue makes it more difficult for undocumented 
migrants to find allies to their cause, and connections with other causes are less frequent than in 
Paris. In Montreal and Berlin, the public invisibility of undocumented migrants greatly restricts 
their collective actions and the possibility of convergence with other allies.  
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 This difference in the symbolic dimension of the citizenship regime is crucial for collective 
actors. In Paris, the specific situation of undocumented migrants being “outside” the national 
community facilitates their ability to present calls for mobilization through what they describe as a 
process of enlargement and intensification of their movement: 
 
In Rennes, Bordeaux, Paris and throughout France and Europe, recent months have 
witnessed strong mobilizations against retention centers. The revolt against Mesnil Amelot 
won Vincennes, and strikers demanded the extension of the movement to all retention 
centers. Let us give more breadth to this movement. Let us support the revolt of 
undocumented persons.lxxxvii (Author’s translation) 
 
In Berlin and Montreal, however, before common claims can be established and protests 
expanded, they must emerge as a public “problem.” The idea is not to participate in collective 
action in order to “join” a movement but rather in order to organize the emergence of this 
movement. Constituents and potential supporters are called to mobilize and provide visibility to the 
cause of undocumented migrants: 
 
To fight against the fear and paranoia generated by the government, we provide mutual 
support within a spirit of solidarity and mutual aid. Today we march so that all of our 
friends and allies who have been deported, detained and forced to live clandestinely or 
in refuge because of their religious beliefs, or who have been victimized by security 
certificates. (…) We refuse to be invisible, and we refuse to live in fear. We demand 
status for everyone. Join our efforts, and we will win.lxxxviii (Author’s translation) 
 
While the impact on collective actions of the low level of politicization of undocumented 
migrant issues is similar in Berlin and Montreal, it has different effects at the individual level. In 
Montreal, the low level of politicization is coupled with a low level of repression and control from 
the police forces, facilitating local mobility and a concrete opportunity to participate in collective 
life by working, attending school, consuming products and services, and establishing social 
relationships. In Berlin, the low level of politicization is coupled with repressive policies, limiting 
the local mobility of undocumented migrants and their participation in society. 
 
 
Conclusion 
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 It is evident that the relationship between the degrees and forms of exclusion from the 
citizenship regime and the content of the mobilizations of undocumented migrants is very complex. 
The links are not mechanical. Other elements must be taken into account to explain why a specific 
network developed as it did in a specific place. Nevertheless, we propose that in the case of 
undocumented migrants, who occupy a very specific position in our societies (at the border of 
citizenship regimes), their concrete conditions of mobilization must be examined to gain an 
understanding of the variations in mobilizations around their cause in the three cities considered. 
We show that the analysis of the links between the concrete conditions of mobilization and the 
content of the mobilizations in each city reveals some of the major social and political 
transformations that are occurring at the heart of these societies.  
 
 In particular, we demonstrate that changes in terms of policing and control of populations 
have an effect on the content and forms of mobilizations of undocumented migrants because they 
influence the opportunities of individuals to circulate locally and to have contact with people 
outside their circles in the course of their mobilizations. In our case, however, more control does not 
automatically mean fewer opportunities for collective mobilization: in the case of Paris, more police 
control combined with a strong public debate have contributed to enlarging the scope of 
mobilizations and the building of bridges with other social movements, even if the mobilizations are 
very precarious, due to repressive policies. Moreover, claims are not only made by non-status 
migrants but also by allies who demand a redefinition of the citizenship regime in all of its 
dimensions (access, recognition and belonging) in order to integrate individuals who play a 
concrete role in national collective life. In Montreal, the lack of public recognition prevents a 
movement from existing fully, and mobilizations of undocumented migrants work more as public 
awareness campaigns, even if individual dimensions of daily life are less restricted than in Paris and 
Berlin. Here, the citizenship regime is sufficiently elastic to allow some leeway at the individual 
scale. In this context, collective action demands changes in collective political representation: 
undocumented migrants search for public recognition.  In Berlin, the same kind of process occurs: 
collective action is limited by the strictly confined public place the issue occupies, and the lives of 
individuals are restricted by very limited access to the citizenship regime. Groups and networks 
search for public recognition as well as for more integration into collective life. In all three places, 
through their individual and collective actions, undocumented migrants participate in the definition 
and redefinition of citizenship regimes. 
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